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Within the recent European policies and actions on illegal content, a trend towards 
the algorithmic enforcement of content regulation has emerged. Hard and soft law 
provisions are more or less explicitly requiring online platforms to resort to 
technological systems in order to comply with the law. The use of technology to 
enforce the law is certainly not new, especially in the realm of copyright law. The 
last step in this process is the employment of algorithmic systems to filter content 
uploaded by third parties and the use of autonomous decision-making to select the 
content that can appear online. This controversial legislative move raises concerns 
not only as to its consistency with the current legal framework but also as to its 
impact on individual rights and societal development in general. This paper 
proposes a regulatory toolkit for a more balanced algorithmic copyright 
enforcement that could, hopefully, also provide insights for a better algorithmic 
society overall. 
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The European Digital Single Market Strategy (‘DSM Strategy’)1 introduced 
a strong trend towards algorithmic enforcement of the rules aiming at preventing 
illegal content online.2 This is part of a broader movement towards algorithmic 
content regulation.3 The trend surfaces from the analysis of the various hard and 
soft law provisions touching upon online intermediaries’ liability that have been 
adopted by the European institutions to fight the upload and spread online of illegal 
content.4 Although the safe harbor regime for online intermediaries set by Directive 
2000/31/EC (‘e-Commerce Directive’) remains untouched, the several instruments 
adopted point toward a system in which intermediaries are required to implement 
technological measures not only to take down but also to prevent the (re)appearance 
of allegedly illegal content online.5 This determines a shift from a regime in which 
the law is enforced after a violation of law has taken place (ex-post) to a system 
where technology ensures that violations do not even occur in the first place (ex-
ante). In this way, the technologies implemented to comply with the law get ahead 
of the threshold of protection and in doing this they change the law itself. 
The case of copyright law is probably the most explicit example of 
algorithmic enforcement and, more specifically, of the shift from an ex-post to an 
ex-ante system of technological enforcement of the law. Forms of algorithmic 
enforcement of copyright law were present well before the adoption of the 
controversial directive on copyright in the DSM (‘DSM Directive’).6 This 
                                               
1 See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A Digital Single 
Market Strategy for Europe, COM (2015), 192 final (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter DSM Strategy]. 
2 See Thomas Riis & Sebastian Felix Schemer, Leaving the European Safe Harbor, Sailing Towards 
Algorithmic Content Regulation, 1 J. Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴇᴛ L. 1 (2019). 
3 Id. 
4 In this work, the terms ‘intermediaries’, ‘online intermediaries’ and ‘online platforms’ are used 
interchangeably. While the focus is on illegal content hosted by online platforms, the umbrella term 
‘intermediaries’ will still be used. See Teresa Rodriguez de las Heras Ballell, The Legal Autonomy 
of Electronic Platforms: A Prior Study to Assess the Need of a Law of Platforms in the EU, 3 Iᴛ. L. 
J. 149, 153–154, 156–160 (2017), for a discussion on the difference between intermediaries and 
online platforms. 
5 See Directive 2000/31, of the European Council of June 8 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of 
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. 
(L 178) 6, 12 [hereinafter e-Commerce Directive]. 
6 See Directive 2019/790, of the European Council of April 17 2019 on Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Digital Single Market. 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92 [hereinafter DSM Directive]. 
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instrument represents only the last step of a process targeting piracy online that 
started several years ago. The resulting shortcomings of this piece of legislation are 
widely known and discussed by many scholars who highlight how a lack of 
accountability challenges many of the legal principles such as freedom of 
expression, due process, and the right to self-determination. 
In this article, I start from the proposition that the algorithmic society is here 
to stay to formulate a proposal for balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. 
Given the technological developments we are witnessing in terms of autonomous 
systems and self-learning algorithms, technology will likely continue to provide an 
increasingly sophisticated compliance tool. If this is the case, we need to be well-
equipped to govern the developments to come. 
The European Union has already offered a variety of hard and soft law 
provisions that can add more balance to algorithmic enforcement. However, the 
many principles, recommendations, suggestions, and tools are not coherently 
organized—rather, they confirm the piecemeal approach that European institutions 
often adopt. 
This article contributes to the existing debate on algorithmic copyright 
enforcement by gathering the acquis communautaire, organizing it in the most 
consistent manner possible, and trying to fill the emerging gaps. As there is no need 
to reinvent the wheel, this article considers the rules already available, adapts them 
to the current scenario, and adds the missing links. As a result, a regulatory toolkit 
is proposed to introduce more balance to algorithmic copyright enforcement. 
Ultimately, the goal of this toolkit is to provide useful insights for a better 
algorithmic society.  
In the following pages, Section I illustrates the development of European 
policies targeting illegal content online and depicts how this interacts with the 
current liability regime for online platforms. Section II turns to the hard and soft 
law provisions that emerged from these EU policies, which drive towards the 
adoption of technology as a main tool of compliance. Section III focuses on 
copyright law as the recent debate surrounding Article 17 of the DSM Directive 
provides the clearest example of the shift from ex-ante to ex-post algorithmic 
enforcement. Section IV summarizes the concerns of algorithmic copyright 
enforcement—more generally, technologies of compliance—and illustrates the 
solutions so far envisaged. Section V introduces the main features of the regulatory 
toolkit for balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. Since algorithms are here 
to stay, there is the pertinent need to make them comply with the legal framework. 
Finally, in Section VI I conclude by stressing the need to continue the conversation 
on the unintended consequences of algorithmic regulation and enforcement. 
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II. TACKLING ILLEGAL CONTENT ONLINE IN THE DSM STRATEGY 
Tackling illegal content is one of the priorities of the DSM Strategy as 
European institutions intend to ensure that that which is illegal offline is also illegal 
online. This represents one of the many regulatory challenges in the process of 
creating the Digital Single Market.7 Naturally, an analysis of the documents 
articulating the DSM Strategy reveals that tackling illegal content requires the 
assessment of online intermediaries’ role and activity. 
The DSM Strategy places special emphasis on three key pillars: (i) access 
for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe; (ii) 
creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish; and (iii) 
maximizing the growth potential of the digital economy.8 The first two pillars touch 
upon the issue of illegal content and more precisely, the intermediaries’ liability for 
illegal content. In this respect, the DSM Strategy clearly states that the “rules on 
the activities of intermediaries in relation to copyright-protected content” are to be 
clarified.9 Similarly, in the pursuit of the second pillar’s goal to optimize digital 
networks and services, the Commission stresses that online platforms’ market 
power can potentially impact other participants in the marketplace.10 While the 
level playing field conditions form one concern, the need to guarantee that minors 
are protected from harmful content and that internet users are protected from hate 
speech and misleading content form equally relevant considerations.11 
This section illustrates the European institutions’ policy on tackling illegal 
content and its impact on platforms’ liability. The main argument centers on the 
proposition that these two fit poorly within the current conditional liability regime 
as set out by the e-Commerce Directive. 
A. An Enhanced Liability Regime for Online Platforms 
The proposition that tacking illegal content requires a more active role of 
online intermediaries emerges very clearly in the EU Commission’s 2017 
Communication on tackling illegal content online.12 Here, the Commission 
                                               
7 See DSM Strategy, supra note 1, at 3. 
8 Id. at 3-4. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 9. 
11 Id. at 11. 
12 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Tackling Illegal Content 
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expressly calls for an enhanced “liability regime” for intermediaries due to the 
strategic role that they perform in mediating content access to internet users.13 
Moreover, whatever content platforms would tackle, from incitement to terrorism, 
hate speech, child sexual abuse material to infringements of IPRs, the Commission 
underlines that online platforms should “adopt effective proactive measures to 
detect and remove illegal online content.”14 While encouraging the use and 
development of automatic technologies to prevent the re-appearance of illegal 
content online,15 the Communication also recalls the need to comply with the 
respective fundamental rights and the necessity to implement the safeguards to limit 
the risk of removing legal online content.16  
As a follow-up to the 2017 Communication, in March 2018 the Commission 
issued a recommendation, which, this time, encompasses more concrete measures 
to effectively tackle illegal content online.17 Even though in this document, the 
Commission has elaborated in some more detail the notice and action procedure 
and at the same time called for the adoption of proactive measures for all types of 
illegal content, its emphasis on the need to implement such a procedure diligently 
and proportionately remains rather hazy.18 In particular, the Commission once more 
focuses on the necessity to adopt automatic filtering systems and encourages online 
platforms to invest in automatic detection technologies.19 
The 2017 Communication and the 2018 Recommendation are only the last 
initiatives of a series of soft law instruments issued by the European institutions. In 
2015 the Commission started the discourse on illegal content with a public 
consultation on the role of online platforms.20 Among several other topics, it also 
covered how best to tackle illegal content on the Internet and the need to reform 
online intermediaries’ liability regime.21 The responses to the consultation did not, 
                                               
Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms, at 2, COM (2017) 555 final (Sept. 
28, 2017). 
13 Id. at 5. 
14 Id. at 10. 
15 Id. at 18. 
16 Id. at 14, 16. 
17 See Commission Recommendation on Measures to Effectively Tackle Illegal Content Online, at 
9, COM (2018) 1177 final (Mar. 1, 2018). 
18 Id at 5. 
19 Id. at 6. 
20 See generally Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for 
Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy (Jan. 
26, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15877. 
21 Id. at 15-21. 
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however, reflect one uniform view, due to the vast differences between the type of 
respondents and their respective interests. For example, on the question of fitness 
of the liability regime under the e-Commerce Directive—most individual users, 
content uploaders, and intermediaries considered it fit-for-purpose—while right 
holders, their associations, and notice-providers identified gaps and were 
unsatisfied with its effectiveness.22  
Despite the highly inconclusive results of the public consultation, in one 
2016 Communication, the Commission set out its official position on the issue of 
tackling illegal content and online platforms.23 Specifically, the Commission 
proposed a problem-driven approach to content regulation, whereby “any future 
regulatory measures proposed at EU level only address clearly identified problems 
relating to a specific type or activity of online platforms in line with better 
regulation principles”.24 Having mentioned that online platforms “come in various 
shapes and sizes and continue to evolve at a pace not seen in any other sector of the 
economy,”25 the Commission stresses their rising importance as well as the need to 
have them operate in a balanced regulatory framework—a framework in which, for 
their role in providing access to information and content, they bear more 
responsibility.26 
The same principles mentioned above are further confirmed in the following 
mid-term review assessment of the progress towards the implementation of the 
DSM, where the issue of illegal content online is tackled from a more practical 
point of view—namely concerning the mechanisms and technical solutions 
necessary for its removal, which in turn must be effective and, at the same time, 
fully respectful of fundamental rights.27 
                                               
22 Id. at 15. 
23 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Online Platforms and the 
Digital Single Market: Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, at 9, COM (2016) 288 final (May 
25, 2016). 
24 Id. at 5. 
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on the 
Implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, at 9 (May 10, 2017), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a4215207-362b-11e7-a08e-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
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B. A Conditional Liability Regime for Online Intermediaries 
The proposition that online intermediaries should take more responsibility 
for the content on their platforms—to the extent of adopting ad hoc technologies to 
enforce the law—is not fully in line with the conditional liability regime introduced 
by the e-Commerce Directive. This stems mainly from two aspects of the Directive. 
Firstly, Article 14 introduces a horizontal safe harbor exemption for “information 
society service providers” performing mere conduit, caching and hosting. In 
particular, intermediaries are exempted from liability for the illegal content 
uploaded by third parties as long as intermediaries are in no way involved with the 
information transmitted. Alternatively, in the case of hosting services, if they do 
not have knowledge or awareness of any illegal activities and, if such knowledge 
is acquired, they should act promptly to remove the illegal content. Secondly, 
Article 15 introduces a prohibition for Member States to impose on online 
intermediaries monitoring obligations of a general nature. 
The element of knowledge or awareness is the key requirement in this 
conditional liability regime.28 If intermediaries acquire knowledge or awareness of 
illegal content on their platforms and fail to react promptly, they no longer fall 
within the safe harbor provided by the exemption. However, not only does the e-
Commerce Directive leave vague the answer to the question of when knowledge 
and awareness are actually acquired, but it also does not specify the process of 
removing the illegal content in question. Unlike the US system, in which the 
legislature has regulated in detail the procedure to be followed by online 
intermediaries,29 even though limiting itself to the violation of copyright under 
section 512 of the DMCA,30 the EU rules leave the process specifics to the 
discretion of market operators—or rather to the Member States.31 In the absence of 
a precise provision at the European level on how intermediaries should react and 
remove infringing content, the US model of notice and takedown (N&TD) has 
become the standard practice for the majority of online intermediaries. In any event, 
in both jurisdictions, under the safe harbor regimes, online intermediaries are 
required to take measures strictly of reactive nature. 
                                               
28 See generally Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A 
Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 481 (2009). 
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
30 Jennifer Bretan, Harboring Doubts About the Efficacy of 512 Immunity under the DMCA, 18 
BERKELEY TECHNOL. LAW J. 27, 43 (2003). 
31 See supra note 5, at 6 (recital 46) (stating that the removal and disabling of access should be dealt 
with at national level). 
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This regime of conditional liability was envisaged as one of the necessary 
means for the development of online services and the flourishing of the information 
society.32 At the same time, it also resulted from the gatekeeping function of 
intermediaries.33 In recent years, the evolving nature of the intermediaries and the 
multiplicity of services and functions they provide has positioned the conditional 
liability regime at the heart of the debate on intermediaries’ fitness to regulate the 
increasingly complex phenomenon of illegal content online.34 Despite the 
profoundly changed market, European institutions have nevertheless declared the 
safe harbors fit for purpose in the many documents adopted to tackle illegal content 
online.35 As a consequence of their so declared fitness, the safe harbors stay intact. 
Yet, the doubt arises as to whether such fitness is more apparent than real. In fact, 
several recently adopted provisions that touch upon the issue of platforms liability 
for illegal content—namely the provisions pointing in the direction of algorithmic 
enforcement—erode the shield offered to online intermediaries under the e-
Commerce Directive,36 to the extent that we can say that although within the DSM 
strategy safe harbors have not been directly revised, their indirect revision has 
certainly taken place. 
III. ALGORITHMIC ENFORCEMENT IN THE DSM STRATEGY 
The problem-driven approach to content regulation consistently promoted 
by the EU is what prompted the adoption of several instruments, each tackling the 
content of a specific nature. The most debated of these instruments is surely the 
DSM Directive targeting copyright-infringing content.37 However, provisions on 
content harmful to minors, terrorist content, IPRs infringing content, and 
                                               
32 See Carsten Ullrich, Standards for Duty of Care? Debating Intermediary Liability from a 
Sectoral Perspective, 8 J. Iɴᴛᴇʟʟ. Pʀᴏᴘ. Iɴꜰᴏ. Tᴇᴄʜ. & Eʟᴇᴄ. Cᴏᴍ. L. 111 (2017). 
33 See Jonathan L Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 Hᴀʀᴠ. J.L. & Tᴇᴄʜ. 253 (2006). 
34 See Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online 
Intermediaries, in Tʜᴇ Eᴠᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Eǫᴜɪʟɪʙʀɪᴜᴍ ᴏꜰ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Dɪɢɪᴛᴀʟ Aɢᴇ 29 (S. Frankel 
& D. Gervais eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017); see also Peggy Valcke, Alexandra Kuczerawy & 
Pieter-Jan Ombelet, Did the Romans Get It Right? What Delfi, Google, eBay and UPC TeleKabel 
Wien Have in Common, in Tʜᴇ RESPONSABILITIES OF Oɴʟɪɴᴇ Sᴇʀᴠɪᴄᴇ Pʀᴏᴠɪᴅᴇʀs 101 (M. Taddeo 
& L. Floridi eds., 2017). 
35 See supra note 23, at 9. 
36 See Giancarlo Frosio, To Filter or Not to Filter? That Is the Question in EU Copyright Reform, 
32 Cᴀʀᴅᴏᴢᴏ Aʀᴛꜱ Eɴᴛᴇʀᴛᴀɪɴ. L. J. 331, 348-349 (2018). See also Maria Lilla Montagnani & Alina 
Trapova, Safe Harbours in Deep Waters: A New Emerging Liability Regime for Internet 
Intermediaries in the Digital Single Market, 26 Iɴᴛ. J. L. Iɴꜰ. Tᴇᴄʜɴᴏʟ. 284, 306-307 (2018); Maria 
Lillà Montagnani & Alina Trapova, New Obligations for Internet Intermediaries in the Digital 
Single Market—Safe Harbors in Turmoil?, 22 J. Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴇᴛ L. 3, 8 (2019). 
37 See discussion infra Section III. 
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misleading content are encompassed in, respectively, the Amending Directive 
Audio Visual Media Services (‘AVMSD’),38 the Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online (‘TERREG’),39 the Guidance on Certain 
Aspects of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs 
Enforcement Guidance’),40 and the Guidance on Unfair Commercial Practice 
(‘UCPD Guidance’).41 In line with the proposition that platforms should bear more 
responsibility for their role in providing access to information and content, all of 
these rules point towards algorithmic enforcement, namely enforcement through 
technological measures and autonomous decision systems.42 The use of technology 
to comply with the law is certainly not new to market operators,43 nor is the use of 
technological measures providing some degree of automation in the enforcement 
of copyright protection.44 The novelty here lies in the legislative drive and 
legitimization of the adoption of such systems to enforce content regulation. 
The push for the use of automated measures to filter and prevent illegal 
content from appearing online was very clear in the initial Commission proposals 
                                               
38 See generally Council Directive 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
November 2018 Amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid 
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of 
Audiovisual Media Services, 2018 O.J. (L 303/699) [hereinafter AVMSD]. 
39 See generally European Parliament Legislative Resolution P8_TA(2019)0421 of 17 April 2019 
on The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventing the 
Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COD (2018) 331 [hereinafter TERREG]. 
40 See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee on Guidance on Certain Aspects of Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, COM (2017) 708 final (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter IPR Enforcement Guidance]. 
41 See generally Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance On the Implementation/ 
Application Of Directive 2005/29/EC On Unfair Commercial Practices, (COM 320) (2016) 
[hereinafter UCPD Guidance]. 
42 See supra note 38-41. 
43 Kenneth A Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 
Tᴇx. L. Rᴇᴠ. 73 669, 729 (2009). 
44 See infra Section III A. 
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of the DSM Directive,45 the AVMSD,46 and the TERREG.47 The proposed texts 
raised significant concerns. These concerns provoked years of debate on several 
aspects of the texts. One such debate centered on the use of technology concerning 
the enforcement of content regulation and tackling illegal content online and its 
consistency with the conditional liability regime.48 The provisions that were 
eventually adopted reflect the debate and considerably soften the push towards the 
use of automated systems to detect or remove illegal content.49 Although not as 
clearly expressed as in the initial versions, algorithmic enforcement remains the 
anonymous protagonist of content regulation in the DSM Strategy.  
I will illustrate that the above-mentioned provisions, despite the 
amendments in their wording, still allude to algorithmic enforcement. My 
discussion then turns to the soft law instruments on misleading and IPR infringing 
content. While soft law is not binding,50 the principles these rules enshrine deserve 
attention as they contribute extensively to the EU’s content regulation framework 
and further confirm the European institutions’ push towards algorithmic 
enforcement.51 
                                               
45 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council On Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Oct. 12, 2016); see also Open letter to the European 
Commission by 40 academics [https://perma/cc/DR76-GZFV] (2017); see also Open Letter to 
Members of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Copyright Reform: 
Open Letter #2 from European Research Centers [https://perma.cc/4686-MNQS]; see also Axel 
Metzger & Mathias Leistner, The EU Copyright Package: A Way Out of the Dilemma in Two Stages, 
48 IIC 381 (2017). 
46 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or 
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services 
in View of Changing Market Realities COM (2016) 0287 final; see also Indrek Ibrus & Ulrike Rohn, 
Sharing Killed the AVMSD Star: The Impossibility of European Audio- Visual Media Regulation in 
the Era of the Sharing Economy, 5 Internet Policy Review 11 (2016). 
47 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventing the 
Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COM (2018) 640 final; see also Joris van Hoboken, The 
Proposed EU Terrorism Content Regulation: Analysis and Recommendations with Respect to 
Freedom of Expression Implications (2019), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/ 
download/TERREG_FoE-ANALYSIS.pdf. 
48 See supra note 46-47.  
49 DSM Directive, supra note 6, art. 17; AVMSD, supra note 38, art. 28(b); TERREG art. 6.  
50 K. C. Wellens & G. M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14 Eᴜʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 267 
(1989). 
51 See id. 
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A. Misleading Content in the DSM Strategy 
In the pursuit of the European institution’s goal to stimulate and promote 
consumer confidence in the digital market, the UCPD Guidance introduces new 
duties for online intermediaries hosting content.52 Given the growing body of 
principles derived from the decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) 
and several national courts, the Commission adopted the Guidance to clarify some 
concepts and provisions of the Directive on unfair commercial practices 
(‘UCPD’).53 
First, the UCPD Guidance extends its discipline to online platforms.54 The 
Guidance declares that the unfair commercial practices discipline also applies to 
new business models that develop in a digital environment—that is, to online 
platforms that qualify as “traders” according to article 2(b) of the UCPD.55 Thus, a 
platform that,  on behalf of its business, charges a commission on the transactions 
between suppliers and users, provides additional paid services, or draws revenues 
from targeted advertising, can be deemed to be a trader, falling within the scope of 
the UCPD. 56 
Second, online platforms qualifying as traders must comply with 
professional diligence and transparency requirements, which require them to refrain 
from misleading actions and omissions while intermediating the promotion, sale, 
or supply of a product to consumers.57  
To this end, online platforms must take appropriate measures to enable 
relevant third-party traders to comply with EU consumer and marketing law 
requirements and help users to clearly understand with whom they are concluding 
contracts.58 Appropriate measures in this context imply, among other things, 
designing the structure of the website in a way that allows professional third parties 
to present information to users of the platform in compliance with Union rules on 
                                               
52 See UCPD Guidance, supra note 41.  
53 See generally Council Directive 2005/29/EC of May 11 2005 on Unfair Business-to-Consumer 
Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L 149/22). 
54 UCPD Guidance, supra note 41, at 110.  






57 Id. arts. 6-7. 
58 UCPD Guidance, supra note 41, at 114. 
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commercial law and consumers.59 More particularly, according to Article 7(4) of 
the UCPD, relates to information on the invitations to purchase.60 
It is this particular obligation that triggers the need for platforms to resort to 
technologies of compliance. Pursuant to the UCPD Guidance, online platforms may 
be considered liable if they do not take appropriate measures to avoid the upload of 
misleading content. 
This obligation raises concern as to its consistency with the liability 
exemption regime established by the e-Commerce Directive. Article 14 of the e-
Commerce Directive is often invoked by platforms claiming that, as mere hosts, 
they are not to be held liable for the information hosted, even when this violates 
consumer protection and constitutes an unfair commercial practice.61 Even though 
in principle, this liability regime and the relevant consumer protection acquis 
communautaire should apply in a complementary manner,62 it is unlikely to occur 
in practice. Instead of being complementary, the UCPD and the e-Commerce 
Directive seem to be alternatives to one another, if not conflicting. First, by 
expressly requiring that platforms comply with the UCPD’s obligations the UCPD 
Guidance is only going to increase the number of clashes between platforms 
invoking Article 14 safe harbor for their hosting activity and internet users who, 
harmed by the misleading content hosted, complain about a lack of compliance with 
the UCPD provisions. Second, and more importantly, online platforms that fall 
within the scope of the UCPD and comply with the professional diligence 
requirements by adopting measures that allow them to intervene in the content, or 
by implementing filtering systems, might no longer fall within the safe harbor 
regime. Third, the interpretation of the obligations imposed by the UCPD is not in 
line with the prohibition on general monitoring as per Article 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive. In fact, Article 5 of the UCPD introduces a “duty of activation” that could 
easily morph into a general obligation to carry out fact-finding.63 
B. IPRs Infringing Content in the DSM Strategy 
Modernizing the enforcement of IPRs is one of the promises of the DSM 
Strategy that goes hand in hand with the issue of tackling illegal content online. 
One of the many consultations carried out by the European Commission within the 
DSM Strategy concerned the need to evaluate and modernize the current legal 
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framework for IPR enforcement.64 The primary topic was to ensure that Directive 
2004/48/EC (‘IPR Enforcement Directive’) actively contributed to ensuring a safe 
online environment for business operators and consumers. The consultation, 
however, also addressed several tangent issues, including the intermediaries’ role 
in enforcing IPRs against illegal content online. 65 
As a result of the public consultation, in 2017 the Commission adopted the 
IPR Enforcement Guidance, which has as its main aim the optimization of the IPR 
Enforcement Directive.66 In doing this, the Commission recalls the several 
initiatives on tackling illegal content online and strives to coordinate with them its 
actions on IPR enforcement. While declaring that the safe harbor regime stays 
intact, it attempts to clarify the intermediaries’ responsibility in detecting and 
removing illegal online content, including content infringing IPRs through the 
adoption of autonomous technological systems that monitor and filter content 
online. 
In particular, referring to filtering systems by intermediaries, the IPR 
Enforcement Guidance draws the line between, on the one hand, an injunction 
requiring a specific content to be removed from a website and, on the other, a 
broader injunction potentially obliging an intermediary to actively monitor all 
content made available on its platform.67 The Commission specifies that the latter 
is prohibited according to Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive as it would 
prompt intermediaries to “install and operate excessively broad, unspecific and 
expensive filtering systems of the type and in the circumstances at issue in the 
Scarlet Extended and SABAM cases.”68 However, it also states that where 
appropriate and within the limits of the above-mentioned provisions the adoption 
of a reasonable duty of care to detect and prevent certain specific types of illegal 
activities may be imposed.69 
This move towards algorithmic enforcement of IP law in the IPR 
Enforcement Guidance sits somewhat uncomfortably with the e-Commerce 
Directive. Similar to the case of misleading content,70 it raises the issue of how a 
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65 See Council Directive 2004/48/EC of April 30 2004 on The Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
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filtering system can comply with the prohibition on general monitoring. Eventually, 
these algorithmic enforcement provisions seem to share the same internal clash: 
algorithmic enforcement complies with the trend for adopting and utilizing 
technological systems that enable platforms to tackle illegal content according to 
the DSM strategy but this does not coherently fit with the currently untouched 
conditional liability regime under the e-Commerce Directive. 
C. Harmful Content in the DSM Strategy 
Public consultation on the review of the AVMSD took place between 6 July 
2015 and 30 September 2015.71 The objective was to make the European audio-
visual media landscape fit for, and aligned to, the 21st-century media framework. 
As a result of the consultation, in May 2016 the Commission proposed a revision 
of the AVMSD,72 which also encompassed provisions on combating hate speech 
and dissemination of harmful content to minors. This introduced new obligations 
for AVMS operators as they now became involved first-hand in tackling illegal 
content—in particular, content harmful to minors and hate speech. 
The proposed revision of the AVMSD did not raise as much concern as the 
proposal for the DSM Directive.73 The amended version was finally adopted in 
November 2018 by the European Parliament and the Council. 
Before illustrating how the revised AVMSD encourages the use of 
technology for compliance, it is first necessary to turn to the definition of video-
sharing platforms as they are now the specific addressees of the new set of 
obligations. Video-sharing platforms are defined as commercial services addressed 
to the public, where the principal purpose of the service (or an essential 
functionality of it) is devoted to providing programs and user-generated videos to 
the general public.74 The scope of such service must then be that of informing, 
entertaining or educating, whereby the means adopted for it should be through 
electronic communications networks; and, finally, the content should be organized 
                                               
71 See generally Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Cᴏᴍᴍɪssɪᴏɴ, Report on the Public Consultation on the Review of the 
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in a way determined by the provider of the service, in particular by displaying, 
tagging and sequencing.75 
Such video-sharing platforms fall within the regulation introduced by the 
newly-adopted Chapter IXa, entitled “Provisions applicable to Video-Sharing 
Platform Services”. In particular, Article 28b of the AVMSD brings in an obligation 
for Member States to ensure that appropriate measures are taken by video-sharing 
platforms to protect: first, minors from content which may impair their physical, 
mental or moral development; second, the general public from content containing 
incitement to violence or hate speech; and third, still the general public from content 
the dissemination of which constitutes a criminal offense, namely “public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offense”, “child pornography” and “racism and 
xenophobia”. 
Measures are appropriate “in light of the nature of the content in question, 
the harm it may cause, the characteristics of the category of persons to be protected 
as well as the rights and legitimate interests at stake”.76 Moreover, they should be 
practicable and proportionate, taking into account the size of the video-sharing 
platform service and the nature of the service it provides.77 Additionally, and more 
importantly, such measures should not lead to any ex-ante control or upload-
filtering of content insofar such actions are not in compliance with Article 15 of the 
e-Commerce Directive. 
In particular, appropriate measures may include reporting/flagging 
operation systems, operating systems through which video-sharing platform 
providers explain to their users what effect has been given to the reporting and 
flagging systems, age verification systems, content rating systems, parental control 
systems, media literacy measures and tools, and raising users’ awareness of those 
measures and tools, and finally, easy-to-use and effective procedures for the 
handling and resolution of users’ complaints to the video-sharing platform provider 
concerning the implementation of the measures.78 At first sight, having examined 
the appropriate measures suggested, the push towards the adoption of algorithmic 
systems here seems quite modest. Yet, turning to Article 28b one grasps the full 
algorithmic enforcement potential of these new provisions. In fact, Article 28b(6) 
permits Member States to impose on video-sharing platform measures that are more 
detailed or stricter than those mentioned above. This is the most controversial part 
of Article 28b as it raises the question as to what measures could be stricter than 
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the measures above mentioned if not filtering systems that prevent harmful content 
and hate speech from being uploaded. It seems that these can only be technological 
systems that autonomously detect illegal content and block its appearance online.  
The scenario is even more complicated as, even here, the adoption of these 
stricter measures needs to be reconciled with the ban on general monitoring 
obligations set by Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive. When adopting stricter 
measures online intermediaries should still “comply with the requirements set out 
by […] Articles 12 to 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC,” which means in turn that such 
measures “shall not lead to any ex-ante control measures or upload-filtering of 
content which do not comply with Article 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC”.79 Now, it 
is still to be determined how an autonomous system monitoring the content posted 
to a platform can detect harmful to minor content or hate speech without the 
recourse to a general monitoring mechanism. Although the AVMSD maintains that 
the regime introduced by the e-Commerce Directive is untouched,80 the issue of 
how to reconcile the new duties with the ban imposed by Article 15 remains highly 
critical. 
D. Online Terrorist Content in the DSM Strategy 
As part of the strategy to tackle illegal content online, from 30 April to 25 
June 2018 the Commission conducted a public consultation on terrorist content. 
This initiative resulted in the proposal for a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online—the TERREG. This proposed Regulation 
encompassed stringent rules for online intermediaries concerning content of 
terrorist nature, such as a one-hour deadline for content to be removed following a 
removal order from national competent authorities, a duty of care for all platforms 
to ensure they are not misused for the dissemination of terrorist content, and 
proactive measures on the side of platforms to protect their users from terrorist 
abuse.81 
The proposed text of the regulation was strongly opposed due to its impact 
on fundamental rights and in particular, freedom of expression.82 It also attracted 
the concern of three independent experts of the United Nations Human Rights 
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Council.83 In this debate, highly problematic was Article 6 which required the 
adoption of proactive measures that would detect, identify and expeditiously 
remove or disable access to terrorist content and would also prevent the re-upload 
of content that has been removed or disabled. The proposal expressly referred to 
the use of automated tools. 
These proactive measures raised a twofold concern which mirrors what was 
already mentioned in respect of misleading, harmful and IPR infringing content. 
First, these measures were deemed to violate Article 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive as they would amount to a general obligation to monitor.84 Also, such 
general monitoring and filtering of content uploaded by users risk to block content 
without any form of due process even before such content is published. This would 
reverse the well-established presumption that States, not individuals, bear the 
burden of justifying restrictions on freedom of expression. Second, these proactive 
measures could also deprive the platform of the protection against liability for third-
party content as per Article 14 of the e-Commerce Directive.85 
Following this debate, the version, finally adopted in April 2019,86 carries 
several amendments. On the one hand, the modifications mitigate the impact of the 
new rules on platforms’ operatively and their freedom to conduct business by 
limiting the measures and actions that platforms should undertake, and on the other 
hand, the amended rules increase the safeguards for fundamental rights by 
narrowing the definition of terrorist content.87 
The aim remains that of tackling terrorist content online as this is “part of a 
broader problem of illegal content online, which includes child sexual exploitation, 
illegal commercial practices, and breaches of intellectual property”.88 Broadly 
speaking, the TERREG addresses online hosting services through which terrorist 
content is disseminated. More specifically, it applies to information society services 
storing user-provided information which is also made available to the public, 
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irrespective of whether this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive 
nature.89 Importantly, the TERREG also applies to host service providers who fall 
within the definition of video-sharing platforms provided in the AVMSD.90 
The broad categories of intermediaries identified must still comply with a 
wide array of duties of care provisions, removal orders, referrals and “specific 
measures”.91 In particular, “specific measures” now replaces the “proactive 
measures” proposed by the Commission. The measures should operate without 
prejudice to the e-Commerce Directive and should be “effective, targeted and 
proportionate, paying particular attention to the risk and level of exposure to 
terrorist content, the fundamental rights of the users, and the fundamental 
importance of the right to freedom of expression and the freedom to receive and 
impart information and ideas in an open and democratic society.”92 
Besides the change in the terminology, Article 7 of TERREG also carries 
several other amendments such as the fact that it is now clearly stated that 
intermediaries are not obliged to monitor or filter the content,93 but the obligation 
to withdraw the illegal content within an hour remains.94 
IV.  ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT IN THE DSM 
The use of technology to enforce the law is not a new concept,95 neither is 
the use of automatic systems to enforce copyright law in the entertainment 
industry.96 
The enforcement of copyright law online has always entailed a certain level 
of automation. However, over the last few years, automation has been progressively 
replaced with autonomy. While the former automated systems typically run within 
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a well-defined set of parameters and are trained in what tasks they can perform, 
autonomous systems learn and adapt to the surrounding environments. In other 
terms, what distinguishes automation from autonomy is the amount of adaptation, 
learning, and decision-making. 
In the following sections, the story of technologies for copyright 
enforcement is articulated in three phases, each representing a step from automation 
towards autonomy. The last step is algorithmic copyright enforcement, which is 
currently heading towards the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning-based programs to tackle illegal content online.97 
A. The Early Phase of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: The Robo-
notice Regime 
The first form of automation that copyright enforcement experienced was 
the adoption of automated notices by right holders based on internet monitoring 
systems. To this, online platforms responded by adopting systems that 
automatically removed the signaled content without any form of human 
intervention.98 
The reason for the adoption of automated systems is usually found in the 
increase of unauthorized material online that in turn resulted in difficulties to 
humanly monitor the spread of unauthorized content. Once human monitoring of 
content online became impractical, right holders started resorting to the 
development and use of automated systems that crawl the internet to detect 
allegedly illegal content. Thereafter, notices were automatically sent to hosting 
platforms. 
On the other hand, to match this trend, the automation of the notices 
triggered automation in the taking down of the indicated content. To limit the risks 
of falling outside the safe harbor regime, online platforms responded to the notices 
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by automatically taking down the content (“automated take-down”).99 As a result, 
the higher the number of notices, the higher the number of take-downs. 
This phenomenon, that goes under the name of “robo-takedown regime”100 
has exacerbated the general public frustration already provoked by the N&TD and 
increased the amount of content erroneously taken down.101 Automation 
significantly impacts the scope of permitted uses that third parties are allowed to 
rely on. It questions the traditional balance that copyright entails between the 
protection of creative works and authorized uses by third parties. 
The matter has also been addressed in court, at least in the US. In the Lenz 
case, the practice of using algorithms to send automated notices raised the question 
as to whether right holders should rely on the same algorithms used to identify 
potential infringement to also make a judgment about fair use. On this point, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed that “fair use … is wholly authorized by the law”102 which 
makes it compulsory for right holders to consider, before issuing a takedown notice, 
whether the possibly infringing content falls within fair use.103 However, assessing 
fair use may prove problematic for any automated system. Distinguishing critical 
reviews, parodies, and transformative remixes from infringing reuses of 
copyrighted material often involve the kind of contextual decision-making that is 
already difficult for humans but proves to be even more complicated, if not 
impossible, for algorithms.104 
In addition to the evidence that non-infringing content is constantly 
removed pursuant to robo-takedown requests, the robo-notice regime also neglects 
the issue of due process. Indeed, the number of counter-notices adopted in response 
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to the algorithmic take-down represents an even smaller percentage than the overall 
number of counter-notices sent and received.105 In sum, the rise of mass notice 
sending via automated systems provokes immediate questions of both accuracy and 
due process.106 
B. The Advanced Phase of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: The 
Voluntary Filtering Regime 
The second level of automation came when some platforms voluntarily 
started to technologically implement agreements signed with right holders—
namely, entertainment majors—to share the revenues generated by the 
phenomenon of user-generated content.107 
The classic example is the Content ID system developed by YouTube.108 
Broadly speaking, this and similar systems match whatever content is uploaded by 
users with the content for which right holders claim copyright and require 
protection.109 Platforms then enable right holders to decide what to do when the 
content uploaded matches their content—to either block it, monetize it, or just 
monitor it.110 In practical terms, the system works by comparing existing and newly 
uploaded contents to “index files” of video or audio material provided by right 
holders. If a user-uploaded video is matched with an audiovisual work in the 
reference file, the respective right holder is notified and has the choice as to what, 
if any, action to take.111 
These systems are the result of the pressure exercised by right holders (in 
particular, the music industry) on intermediaries and the attempt to involve them 
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even more in the fight against piracy.112 In the pursuit of the liability rules within 
the e-Commerce Directive, platforms not only agree to perform a gatekeeping 
function, but they also encode that function in algorithms and software.113 By doing 
this, they go even beyond what is required by law, namely the N&TD under the 
DMCA,114 or the expeditious removal of the infringing content in the e-Commerce 
Directive.115 Instead, they voluntarily adopt filtering systems that detect possibly 
infringing content uploaded by users.116 
Compared with the robo-notice regime in the first stage, this second level 
of automation takes place in the absence of specific regulation which leads to an 
amplification of the risks present in the previous phase. The N&TD procedure, even 
when automated, occurs within a legal framework providing mandatory safeguards 
for users.117 Instead, filtering systems voluntarily adopted by right holders are 
unregulated which means that safeguards for third party users are entirely left to the 
discretion of platforms and depend on choices made by rights holders and 
platforms.118 
In addition, filtering systems share the same concern raised by the robo-
notice regime as to the permitted uses reserved to third users. Even here, the 
capacity of automated filtering systems to distinguish between infringing content 
and content that constitutes a permitted use, such as parodies or educational content, 
is questionable. To address this issue, platforms have already started developing 
filtering systems that employ AI and machine learning to distinguish between 
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infringing content and permitted content.119 This is where the shift from automation 
to autonomy starts to materialize. The more sophisticated filtering systems become, 
the more they walk away from automation to enter the realm of autonomy, i.e. a 
realm in which the decision as to whether particular content amounts to a permitted 
use is left to an algorithm. 
C. The Current Phase of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: Article 17 
of the Directive on Copyright in the DSM 
The last phase of copyright enforcement is represented by Article 17 of the 
DSM Directive. In a nutshell, this much controversial provision introduces the 
direct liability of “online content sharing service providers storing and giving 
access to large amounts of works”120 for the content that they host. It imposes on 
them an obligation to either sign licensing agreements with right holders for the 
content that the service provider stores, or to otherwise prevent protected content 
from (re)appearing online. 
More in detail, since “online content sharing service providers perform an 
act of communication to the public”, they should conclude fair and appropriate 
licensing agreements with right holders.121 These agreements also cover “the 
liability for works uploaded by the users of such online content sharing services in 
line with the terms and conditions set out in the licensing agreement.”122 In case 
these agreements are not reached—that is, the licensing obligation is not complied 
with—another obligation is triggered. To avoid liability, hosting platforms shall 
demonstrate that they not only have made “best efforts to obtain an authorization” 
but, more significantly, that they have “made, in accordance with high industry 
standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of 
specific works and other subject matter for which the right holders have provided 
the service providers with the relevant and necessary information.”123 This last 
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obligation implies the implementation of technological measures which, in a very 
similar fashion to the filtering systems developed in the previous phase, would 
screen what users upload. The system would then prevent the availability online of 
the works that match those indicated by right holders.124 
In addition to the obligations above, Article 17(4)(c) also introduces a 
mechanism that can be defined as Notice & Stay Down (N&SD).125 This entails 
that a single notification of an infringing work would now oblige an intermediary 
to forever prevent its reappearance on the platform. Even in the case in which the 
platform has managed to obtain a license—and in theory, it is not obliged to adopt 
any technological measures pursuant to Article 17(4)(b)—in practice it is still 
mandated to adopt a system that will prevent content for which a notice has been 
sent from being uploaded again by another user.126 This obligation can hardly be 
complied with if not through a system that filters the content that users constantly 
upload. 
Compared to Article 13 of the initial text of the DSM Directive proposed 
by the Commission in 2016,127 in the current text, the reference to technological 
measures of content recognition is not explicit. In this sense, Article 17, at first 
sight, seems to take a step back and focus more on a licensing obligation rather than 
a filtering one. While Article 13 and its corresponding recitals (38) and (39) 
explicitly mentioned the use of technological measured to prevent illegal content 
from being uploaded, i.e. “effective content recognition technologies”,128 such 
mentions were all dropped in Article 17. However, the difference is more apparent 
than real. In this sense, unless exempted, online platforms are in any case forced to 
resort to the same filtering systems that they already started to voluntarily adopt in 
the previous phase. 
The real change brought about by Article 17 is that it compels the adoption 
of filtering systems. It does this in two cases. This happens first when a licensing 
agreement with right holders on the content uploaded by third parties on their 
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platform cannot be reached. Here, under Article 17(4)(b), if platforms want to avoid 
being considered directly liable for communicating to the public the content 
uploaded by their users, they have to implement filtering systems to detect such 
content and block its upload. Absent an agreement, filtering systems become thus 
the standard to avoid liability. However, platforms already voluntarily adopt 
filtering systems to be sure to fall within the safe harbor set under Article 14 of the 
e-Commerce Directive.129 Therefore, what the current Article 17 does is to make 
this practice compulsory to avoid not only secondary liability—as in the previous 
phase of algorithmic copyright enforcement—but also direct liability for 
infringement of the right of communication to the public. Second, by introducing 
the N&SD as a standard practice to be followed in any event, even in the presence 
of a license, Article 17 extends the adoption of filtering systems to all platforms, 
regardless of whether or not they have secured a license from the right holders. In 
other words, according to Article 17(4)(c), whenever content is taken down, a 
platform should ensure that it is not re-uploaded by any third party. Again, as this 
is an obligation that can only be performed through filtering systems, these become 
the standard to comply with the N&TD introduced by Article 17 regime. 
The adoption of Article 17—or better, its statutory request to adopt 
technologies to enforce the law—has legal and factual consequences. In the first 
place, its requests may amount to a general filtering obligation in violation of 
Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive, regardless the proposition that “[t]he 
application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation.”130 
The DSM Directive implies that right holders can communicate information on the 
works—and other subject-matter—which they do not want to be available 
online.131 It is highly likely that these lists of works will be rather extensive and 
would eventually result in a quasi-general monitoring obligation on the side of the 
intermediaries. 
On a more general basis, there is an issue of consistency between the DSM 
Directive and the safe harbor regime. In particular, there is a general lack of 
coordination between Article 17 of the DSM Directive and Article 14 of the e-
Commerce Directive as interpreted by the CJEU case law in regards to active and 
passive hosting providers.132 Specifically, according to Article 17(3) platforms that 
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are addressees of the new rules do not fall anymore within Article 14 of the e-
Commerce Directive. This carves out an exception in the safe harbor regime, which 
may raise issues as to where to draw the line between platforms for which the CJEU 
interpretation of active/passive hosting providers still applies and to assess those 
which fall within Article 17 of the new Directive. 
In the second place, the system introduced by Article 17 shifts algorithmic 
enforcement from ex-post to ex-ante.  Before the adoption of Article 17, ex-post 
enforcement, i.e. the robo-notice regime,133 coexisted with cases in which platforms 
voluntarily through filtering systems prevented content from being uploaded,134 the 
regime under Article 17(4)(b) bring in a form of ex-ante filtering obligation 
according to what is asked by right holders. Besides, Article 17(4)(c) introduces a 
system which is partially ex-ante and partially ex-post. It is  ex-post when the first 
notice is sent, and ex-ante afterward, in regards to all the possible re-uploaders of 
that same content. Consequently, this new regime advances the threshold of 
protection granted to copyright law: it statutorily requires the use of algorithms not 
only to enforce copyright law once a violation has taken place but also to prevent a 
violation from taking place in the first place. Eventually, this blurs the line between 
algorithmic enforcement and algorithmic content regulation. Such a changing 
nature of algorithmic enforcement, i.e. more and more ex-ante, transforms it from 
a compliance tool into one of regulation. 
Third, Article 17 also pushes towards the implementation of increasingly 
autonomous filtering systems. While in the voluntary filtering systems phase, 
safeguards as far as legitimate uses of copyright content, as well as consideration 
of fundamental rights, are not explicitly required, the DSM Directive expressly calls 
for certain exceptions or limitations not to be affected and the data of individual 
users to be protected per Directive 2002/58/EC and Regulation (EU) 2016/679.135 
This approach introduces within the European legal framework the principle 
jurisprudentially developed in the US through the Lenz case.136 Such a step requires 
that filtering systems ought to develop in a way that takes into consideration third 
parties' interests as well as fundamental rights. A development of this kind can only 
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occur by relying more heavily on AI and machine learning, the concern of which 
will be illustrated in the following section. 
V. THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY OF ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT 
ENFORCEMENT 
Regardless of the general hype around algorithmic enforcement, and its 
implications for copyright law, in particular, such systems raise a fair amount of 
concern. Several scholars have already tried to mitigate such discontent. In the 
following, I will consider the concerns and address the possible mechanisms that 
could tackle the alarming consequences of algorithmic copyright enforcement. 
A. Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and its Shortcomings 
The first cluster of concerns deals with the convergence of all law 
enforcement functions137 in the hands of intermediaries that are private 
companies.138 Through the privatization of a function that is usually public, we 
witness a delegation of power to online intermediaries.139 It has been observed that 
automated systems become the “de facto delegations of rulemaking power” as they 
are those who encode the law into decision-making programs.140 Besides, the 
convergence of the enforcement functions merges all phases of the traditional case-
by-case, human-driven process of detection, prosecution, adjudication, and 
execution of the law into a one-step process, which is now technologically 
performed.141 For instance, in the case of copyright law, private online platforms 
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employ algorithms to detect the possibly infringing content and decide whether it 
infringes. Then, based on this, content is automatically made available online or 
not. This process is characterized by an evident lack of accountability on behalf of 
private platforms for the way in which their algorithms enforce the law.142 Users 
affected by the algorithmic decision making are not able to understand the reasons 
why the content they tried to upload failed to appear online and what is more, are 
not able to challenge such decisions. 
A lack of accountability makes it also difficult to correct autonomous 
decision-making derived from biased algorithms. It is in fact known that 
algorithmic decision-making may result in biased outcomes whenever the computer 
system systematically and unfairly discriminates against certain individuals or 
groups of individuals in favor of others. Regardless of the origin of bias—were it a 
pre-existing bias rooted in social institutions, practices, and attitudes, or a technical 
bias deriving from technical constraints or considerations, or an emergent bias 
arising in a context of use—the more complex a system is, the more biases remain 
hidden in the code, which are difficult to pinpoint or explain. Biased systems, thus, 
offer no means for appeal.143 
The main excuse for such a lack of accountability is that algorithms are 
opaque by nature.144 This inherent opacity would derive from algorithms being 
innately non-transparent as they amount to complex code that even programmers 
cannot easily comprehend. Indeed, algorithms now combine more than one 
decision tree to generate the required outcome and this adds to the issues of opacity 
that of explicability or interpretability.145 Predictive algorithms are becoming 
harder to decipher ex-post, which in turn makes it particularly complicated for the 
addressees of decision-making operations to challenge the effect of such 
decisions.146 This is further exacerbated in the case of self-learning algorithms that, 
after being fed with large amounts of data, develop on their own and react to the 
environment in ways that cannot be foreseen.147 This feature of autonomy renders 
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algorithms even less accountable.148 The performance of tasks with less, or entirely 
without, supervision, coupled with the algorithm’s capacity to adjust according to 
the data collected in the course of the operation, make it impossible to predict ex-
ante the decisions that they will take.149 Furthermore, scrutinizing ex-post the result 
of such operations becomes if not unfeasible extremely difficult.150 In addition, as 
new data constantly pours in and algorithms continue to evolve, even if 
interpretation were viable, it would be bound to change all the time, i.e. it would 
reveal information that is cogent to a specific moment but it would not disclose the 
pattern followed in the decision-making.151 
On top of the inherent opacity of algorithms, there is also a layer of 
opaqueness artificially created by those who develop and employ them. It is indeed 
the norm for private institutions to consider algorithms as their intellectual property. 
In fact, most algorithms are proprietary (e.g. Google Search and Facebook News 
Feed) covered primarily by trade secrets.152 This is surely the case within the 
European Union, where the recently revised Trade Secrets Directive prevents the 
unauthorized acquisition, use, or disclosure of algorithms covered by trade 
secrets.153 Such protection is available as long as the algorithm is not generally 
known or easily accessible, has commercial value, and the person who has control 
of it takes steps to keep it secret.154 Similarly, in the US, a trade secret is granted 
broad protection in the form of secrets that derive actual or potential independent 
economic value as long as reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy is made.155 
Besides acting at the state level, a lawsuit can also be brought at the federal level. 
The Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016 allows an owner of a trade secret to sue in 
individuals or organizations suspected of stealing confidential information in 
federal court.156 Although definitions differ between jurisdictions, the broad notion 
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of a trade secret could be seen as encompassing algorithms.157 Accordingly, the 
current practice is  to keep them as secret as possible.158 
One corollary of this opacity and limited—or non-existent—accountability 
is the lack of due process, i.e. the absence of meaningful opportunities for affected 
individuals to contest algorithmic decisions.159 In a system where algorithms 
become decision-makers and govern important aspects of individual lives, lack of 
due process could pave the way to a “new feudal order of unaccountable 
reputational intermediaries”.160 
Algorithmic copyright enforcement is emblematic of such a risk. In 
principle, the N&TD—at least in the US version which has become the de facto 
standard—provides for a counter-notice to be issued by a user whose content has 
been taken down. This system has however been labeled as ineffective in granting 
users the right to react to algorithmic decisions as the possibility is theoretically 
available but practically unfeasible.161 Users are not inclined to respond to notice 
with a counter-notice and tend to passively accede to the platforms’ operations.162 
Things get even worse as far as ex-ante filtering and the N&SD are 
concerned. In both cases, users are not provided an opportunity to react and assert 
their rights as far as the uploaded content is concerned.163 For example, although 
Article 17(9) of the DSM Directive requires some complaint and redress 
mechanisms to be adopted, it is for the platforms to define how these should work 
based on a cooperative process between themselves.164 This generates a disparity 
between the right of copyright holders and those of users.165 While the copyright 
holders are granted protection under a legal provision, the users are safeguarded 
merely through a possible self-regulatory procedure that online platforms should 
collaborate to set up.166 
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A second corollary of opacity lies in the general lack of public oversight on 
enforcement that is privately carried out.167 As a matter of fact, there is no way to 
oversee what content—and on what grounds—is allowed on platforms and under 
what conditions.168 Even when platforms publish transparency reports, it is simply 
impossible to monitor intermediaries’ activities.169 Public oversight is further 
impeded by the claim that transparency cannot be challenged as algorithms are 
valuable trade secrets.170 In particular, the ex-ante enforcement that algorithms 
enable limits the possibility to correct errors and this in turn significantly curbs the 
possibility for the public to intervene and have a voice.171 
A further cluster of concerns relates to the establishment of technological 
normativity, i.e. the embodiment of norms in automated systems, devices, and 
agents.172 In particular, when technologies bear a “constitutive normativity,” they 
determine users’ actions as well as how they can operate and act.173 In this case, 
technology can end up not only conditioning individuals’ behaviors but also 
altering the essence of the law as such.174 
The impact of technological normativity on the law is evident in the case of 
copyright enforcement online. It is because of technological normativity that both 
the internal and external balances, typical of copyright law, are modified.175 All 
jurisdictions encompass internal mechanisms that limit the scope of copyright, 
among which are exceptions and limitations in civil law countries and fair use or 
fair dealing in common law countries.176 Similarly, on an external front, copyright 
protection finds boundaries in other branches of the law, such as fundamental rights 
and freedoms, particularly the freedom of expression and the right to privacy, but 
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also competition law through which compulsory licenses are usually imposed.177 
Internal and external mechanisms should not be understood as two separate 
spheres.178 The need to resort to external balance arises when the internal 
safeguards do not adequately cater for instances other than granting protection to 
authors and right holders.179 However, it has been stressed that this “inside/outside 
location metaphor” can be seen as a distinction between the types of considerations 
required to resolve a given dispute.180 When internal safeguards are applicable, the 
conflict is between instances grounded within copyright law. When, on the other 
hand, the conflict is rooted in different grounds – such as copyright vis-a-vis 
freedom of expression—there is the need for balancing between different 
fundamental rights.181 
Now, once copyright enforcement becomes algorithmic, the decision as to 
whether content falls within a permitted use or represents an instance of freedom 
of expression is delegated to the autonomous system in place.182 A balancing 
operation that is usually carried out by humans is adopted by an algorithm 
employing various degrees of autonomy, depending on how it has been 
programmed.183 Algorithms translate legal mandates into code. This implies that 
the interpretation of the law may, and most often is, affected by a variety of 
extrajudicial considerations, including the conscious and subconscious professional 
assumptions of program developers, as well as various private business 
incentives.184 As a matter of fact, there are numerous cases in which algorithmic 
decision-making has resulted in a lack of consideration of permitted uses or 
fundamental freedoms.185 These cases span from the famous Lenz case in the US in 
2007, which saw YouTube taking down the “dancing baby video” featuring a child 
dancing in the family’s kitchen to Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy by Prince,”186 to 
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the several cases in which songwriters complained that the Content ID incorrectly 
identified their works as infringing.187 
Over the years, the story of algorithmic copyright enforcement shows how 
the employment of increasingly autonomous systems has tilted the balance of 
copyright law, namely, “if copyrighted materials were once available unless proven 
to be infringing, today materials that are detected by algorithms are removed from 
public circulation unless explicitly authorized by the right holder”.188 To be on the 
safe side, online intermediaries implement algorithms that remove or impede the 
upload of allegedly infringing content. Therefore, a question arises as to whether 
algorithms are capable of considering permitted uses or are intermediaries just 
employing algorithms that disregard permitted uses. The concern raised by the 
effects of technological normativity is thus twofold. On the one hand, it questions 
how technology is used to comply with the law and, on the other hand, it discusses 
the aptness of technology to efficiently implement the law. 
B. Proposals to Overcome the Shortcomings of Algorithm Enforcement 
The above-mentioned concerns have already been raised by several scholars 
who have also proposed solutions to overcome them. Measures to cope with 
algorithmic enforcement in general –and algorithmic copyright enforcement in 
particular– are aimed at understanding the algorithmic decision-making process, 
providing sufficient opportunities to challenge an algorithmic decision and 
correcting erroneous or improper outcomes regarding online content. A 
fundamental prerequisite to achieving the above is having transparent, explicable, 
and accountable algorithms. Perel and Elkin-Koren propose an intervention at 
several levels to enhance accountability—from individual users and the public’s 
general involvement to an official regulatory activity.189 In particular, concerning 
the latter, standards of algorithm disclosure, as well as reporting obligations, should 
be in place.190 Transparency would surely be increased if intermediaries are 
required to disclose the criteria their algorithms consider when determining 
copyright infringement. This should include quantitative thresholds (i.e. what 
percentage of the copyrighted work must be used to cause content restriction) and 
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fair use policies.191 However, these same authors,192 as well as other scholars in the 
field,193 caution about the drawback of transparency as this is just a means to 
accountability and not an end in itself. Unveiling the algorithm’s code is a way to 
make those employing them more accountable, but it does not constitute 
accountability in itself. An algorithmic process is only truly accountable when its 
stakeholders can intervene to change the algorithm or its implementation. In other 
words, transparency is a fundamental step towards accountability when it enables 
due process and public oversight. 
As far as due process is concerned, Citron has suggested the introduction of 
a “technological due process,” by which accountability would be enhanced through 
the establishment of procedures ensuring that predictive algorithms live up to some 
standard of review and revision.194 Consequently, this would guarantee fairness and 
accuracy.195 In particular, the author suggests the adoption of automated systems to 
generate audit trails that record the facts and rules supporting their decisions, to 
provide a comprehensive history of the decisions made in a case.196 The author also 
proposes that the source codes of such automated systems are released to the public 
as this would prevent inadvertent and procedurally defective rulemaking.197 
Opening up the source code would expose how a system works. Moreover, before 
the release for mass use, such systems should be tested, and texting should continue 
to run even during their implementation, as well as take place every time policies 
change.198 Finally, the ways to allow the public to participate in the building of 
automated decision systems should be envisaged when such systems are adopted 
by administrative agencies.199 The same principles are adopted and further 
developed also by Crawford and Schultz, who look for a fair and reasonable 
procedure in the case of privacy harm.200 The authors suggest the introduction of 
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an external regulator or audit body which might investigate complaints and provide 
mediation or adjudication.201 
Similarly, as transparency itself is not enough to enable public oversight, 
Perel and Elkin-Koren advocate that users need to resort to self-help as a more 
efficient means of ensuring accountability of algorithms.202 Using algorithmic 
copyright enforcement as a case study, the authors demonstrate how “tinkering” 
can provide a valuable research methodology to explore the hidden practices of 
algorithms. Therefore, legal intervention should be called for in favor of “tinkering” 
activities. For example, a statutory immunity could be considered for researchers 
and users tinkering a safe harbor to understand its functioning.203 In other words, 
“tinkering” is formulated as the “freedom to understand, discuss, repair, and modify 
the technological devices you own,”204 which, in the case of algorithms, morphs 
into “an important tool to proactively check the credibility, fairness, and 
trustworthiness of algorithms that cannot be adequately reviewed through 
traditional means of transparency.”205 In other words, tinkering encourages public 
oversight as it enables the public to exercise judgment and demand that algorithmic 
enforcement complies with the public interest.  
Moving to the limits of technological normativity, a way of overcoming the 
imbalances that it may generate is that of designing the technology in a way that 
encompasses and balances all the interests at stakes. For example, in the case of 
copyright, Elkin-Koren proposes a fair use by design, which could be achieved by 
“translating fair use considerations into a set of instructions that can be executed on 
certain data sources, and writing them in programing language that is readable by 
computers.”206 This could be made more efficient by the latest development in 
AI.207 However, given the challenges of applying AI and machine learning to detect 
fair use, the author suggests that a new approach to fair use is needed—an approach 
that encompasses a shift from a case-by-case analysis to legal scrutiny of the AI 
system as such, and of its procedures, measures and error rate.208 
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On the other hand, Dan Burk highlights the risks of algorithmic fair use.209 
As fair use is an ex-ante indeterminate legal standard translating its values in code, 
the embedding of these same values in public behavior and consciousness is not 
achievable. As a consequence, algorithmic fair use would carry the very real 
possibility of adapting new media participants to its own biases. Eventually, the 
original balanced fair use as envisaged by the legislature would be progressively 
altered, and the public would no longer benefit from the fair use as originally 
conceived.210 
Now, it is incontestable that a new framework for addressing algorithmic 
governance must be developed, possibly by “rethinking the role of courts and of 
judicial oversight”211 or by establishing a sound governance system of autonomous 
systems. At the same time, taking fair use as an example, the social costs of an 
algorithm implementing an ex-ante determination of the law should be of concern 
and be addressed in such a framework itself. 
VI. TOWARDS A BALANCED ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
The debate on algorithmic copyright enforcement is extensive, in particular 
when framed within the algorithmic accountability discussion.212 Similarly vast is 
the literature on the solutions to make algorithms more accountable, fair and 
transparent.213 Nonetheless, these do not yet amount to wide-ranging practices. 
Therefore, in the following sections, I formulate a proposal for a more balanced 
algorithmic copyright enforcement. To avoid reinventing the wheel, I draw from 
other fields of law, such as data protection and environmental law, adapting some 
of the solutions that have already been offered and filling the gaps that need to be 
filled in the pursuit of comprehensiveness and consistency. 
My proposal consists in the adoption of a principle for balanced algorithmic 
copyright enforcement, which translates into the need for open record policies and 
a right to explanation. This in turns is coupled with the obligation of a right-based 
impact assessment and a right to audit. While devised with algorithmic copyright 
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enforcement in mind, this regulatory toolkit can hopefully provide insight for a 
more balanced algorithmic society overall. 
A. The Principle of a Balanced Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement 
The majority of literature on algorithmic copyright enforcement focuses on 
how negatively they can impact individuals and envisages tools to enhance 
algorithms' accountability,214 which, in many cases concern the enhancement of 
transparency.215 However, the essential question is not just how to make algorithms 
transparent and accountable to affected individuals. It pertains to the broader issue 
of how to encourage private companies implementing algorithms to develop norms, 
policies, and technical tools that will make algorithmic enforcement and decision 
making in general more balanced—that is, capable of contemplating and 
overseeing the interests of all parties involved. 
This ambitious goal requires placing algorithmic decision-making within a 
sound legal framework, which establishes the necessity that technology is not used 
to comply solely with one set of rules such as copyright law. Instead, technology 
should take into consideration the interests and values present in the overall system 
holistically. 
Generally speaking, one may take this principle for granted. Yet, as 
algorithmic copyright enforcement in the DSM market demonstrates, this is 
certainly not the case. Article 17 of the DSM Directive obliges online content-
sharing service providers to offer protection to copyright works and, to this end, 
imposes the twofold obligation of licensing or filtering. Provided that a platform 
complies with either of the two limbs, it can escape liability for infringement of the 
communication right.216 The same provision also calls for safeguards to be 
introduced to avoid limiting third parties’ permitted uses under the copyright 
exceptions and limitation regime. In particular, Article 17(7) provides that “[t]he 
cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders 
shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject-matter 
uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including 
where such works or other subject-matter are covered by an exception or 
limitation.” Following the same lines, Recital 70 recommends that “[u]sers are 
allowed to upload and make available content generated by users for the specific 
purposes of quotation, criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche” as these are 
“particularly important for striking a balance between the fundamental rights laid 
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down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular 
the freedom of expression and the freedom of the arts, and the right to property, 
including intellectual property rights. Moreover, an effective complaint and redress 
mechanism to support use for such specific purposes is equally important. 
The DSM Directive calls for safeguards to be introduced to make copyright 
enforcement balanced. Yet, the precise specification of these safety measures is left 
to the discretion of online intermediaries or rather to the collaboration between 
them and rightholders. This generates a clear imbalance between the protection of 
copyright works, detailed at a legislative level, and protection of other interests such 
as freedom of information or permitted uses, that are left at the level of self-
regulation, namely upon the discretion of those same intermediaries deploying 
algorithms to avoid being liable. Such a distortion is the first obstacle in achieving 
balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. It needs to be offset by the adoption 
of a clear principle that details the steps of the process that intermediaries would 
adopt to accomplish balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. 
The principle of balanced copyright enforcement is necessary but alone is 
not enough. There is a further need for a more intense regulatory involvement in 
oversight and accountability as far as technological measures of compliance are 
concerned.217 As these choices cannot be left in the hands of those who are at the 
same time forced to enforce copyright protection, the following sections put 
forward a set of measures aiming at limiting the discretion of online intermediaries 
in enforcing copyright law and rendering them accountable for their operations. 
The ultimate goal of this regulatory toolkit is that of achieving a form of “balance 
by design.” 
 
B. Algorithmic Explainability: From Open Record Policies to a Right to 
Explanation 
Balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement requires algorithmic 
explainability. This is the possibility of understanding the question answered by the 
algorithm and how it arrives at it. Explainability can be achieved by demanding that 
firms employing autonomous systems adopt open record policies and by granting a 
right of explanation to individuals that are affected by automated decision-making. 
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Broadly speaking, an open record policy entails that online intermediaries 
reveal the relevant structures, logic, and policies underlining the adopted 
algorithms. Proposed by Brauneis and Goodman as an empirical project for better 
governance of smart cities, the open record policy could be extended to private 
firms involved in algorithmic enforcement.218 In this way, one could establish a 
record generation practice creating information on the design, the procurement, and 
the implementation of algorithmic processes.219 
The adoption of an open record policy has the advantage of overcoming the 
transparency problems, in particular when it is achieved by disclosing the 
proprietary code.220 Yet, given the complexity of such algorithms, in the majority 
of cases, a disclosure obligation would not enable the understanding of how the 
algorithm indeed works. Instead of resorting to the code disclosure, an algorithm 
can still be rendered transparent enough by revealing some combination of 
mathematical and logical notation, natural language and information regarding how 
data is selected, including the rules of operation chosen and the steps taken to 
validate those choices.221 Besides the model design choices, the data selection, the 
factor weighting, and validation elements, the records should also indicate the 
questions to which the algorithm provides an answer. This is crucial in the 
assessment of the algorithm’s effectiveness, fairness, and political acceptability.222 
Essentially, an open policy record is a key element in the process of making 
algorithms explainable. This becomes even more evident when coupled with the 
legibility test developed by Malgieri and Commande.223 According to the authors, 
the algorithm’s inherent functionality and its strict logic should be kept distinct 
from its contextual use, consequences, and impact.224 Indeed, it is from the 
understanding of both the technical architecture of an algorithm (the functionality 
and the logic involved) and its contextual implementation (the significance of 
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decision-making and its envisaged consequences) that its legibility derives and in 
turn, generates algorithmic explainability.225 
Open record policy provides an ex-ante means of making algorithmic 
copyright enforcement more balanced. This needs to be complemented with an ex-
post tool in the hand of the individuals affected by the algorithmic decision-making. 
Such an ex-post tool could encompass a set of individual rights as already done in 
other branches of law such as data protection, namely, the right to obtain an 
explanation as to the algorithm affecting the individual in question. For example, 
Article 22 of the GDPR introduces a right to receive “meaningful information 
about” the logic, significance, and consequences of algorithmic data processing, 
when a decision is the result of a completely automatic process.226 Now, there is 
extensive debate as to what right, if any, Article 22 introduces. In principle, the 
article merely states that a “data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing … which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”227 But, recital 
71 of the GDPR clearly refers to “the right to obtain … an explanation of the 
decision reached” through the processing of personal data.228 While many 
commentators, adopt a broad reading of Article 22 and conceptualize it as a right 
to understand the reason,229 others read it more literally as the right to exercise the 
decision to not be subject to any autonomous decision-making.230 
The reality is that the tool provided by Article 22 is very narrow,231 as it 
amounts to a mere right to be informed.232 Thus, it is unlikely that it would be of 
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any use in tackling the imbalances of algorithmic copyright enforcement. To put 
this in context, consider the case of an Internet user who seeks to understand the 
reasons for an automatic takedown or the automatic prevention of one of her 
uploads. Several requirements need to be met so that the user can actually resort to 
Article 22. In the first place, there must be some processing of her personal data 
such as the IP address. Then, the take-down or the impossibility of uploading should 
be the result of a decision solely based on automated processing. This in itself 
entails three further elements: first, there must be a decision; second, the decision 
must result from automated processing; and, third, there must be no human 
intervention in the process. Eventually, the decision must produce legal effects 
concerning the user or significantly affect her by, for example, limiting her freedom 
of expression. If all of these requirements are present, a user can rely on Article 22 
provided that none of the exceptions envisaged by the GDPR apply. In this respect, 
the user needs not to have explicitly agreed to the automatic decision-making;233 
such automatic decision-making needs not to be necessary for entering into or 
performing a contract between the user and the platform;234 nor needs the 
automated decision-making to have been authorized by a Member State national 
law.235 Moreover, since a user likely consents to automatic decision-making when 
adhering to the platform’s terms of use, it results that Article 22 cannot provide a 
tool for transparency in the case where algorithmic copyright enforcement leads to 
an erroneous—or at least debatable—takedown of a user’s uploaded content. 
Despite the narrow applicability of Article 22, the overall solution 
championed by the GDPR as to the set of individual rights conferred to the data 
subjects may be suitable to introduce a right to explanation.236 Article 22, when 
coupled with Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h), may offer a valuable model 
for a more balanced algorithmic enforcement. Considered together, these 
provisions constitute a right to be made aware of the existence of automated 
decision-making, which includes profiling under Article 22(1) and (4). 
Furthermore, what is envisaged is the right to receive meaningful information about 
the logic involved in such processing, as well as its significance and its 
consequences for the data subject. In particular, Articles 13 and 14 introduce 
“notification duties,” whereby information must be provided when the processing 
of personal data begins. Moreover, Article 15 stipulates that one has the right to 
access all those pieces of information at any moment. Consequently, since the 
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information to be provided as part of the notification duty concerns “the existence 
of automated decision-making, including profiling and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and 
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject”, it enables the 
understanding of both the architecture and the implementation of the algorithmic 
decision-making.237 
Interestingly, the interpretation of “meaningful information” offered by the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (‘A29WP’) in the Guidelines on 
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the GDPR closely 
resembles what an open policy record would entail.238 According to the A29WP’s 
opinion, meaningful information concerns the logic involved. In most cases, this 
“logic” will require controllers to provide details such as the information used in 
the automated decision-making process, including the categories of data used in a 
profile and the source of that information, how any profile used in the automated 
decision-making process is built—including any statistics employed in the 
analysis—the reason a profile is considered relevant in the automated decision-
making process, and how it is used for a decision concerning the data subject.239 
Even though the applicability of Article 22is limited to algorithmic decision-
making that processes personal data, it offers a model to consider when aiming for 
algorithmic explainability. 
In sum, more balanced algorithmic enforcement would require both ex-ante 
and ex-post regulatory tools, i.e. generating records depicting how the algorithm is 
designed, how it works, and what it is intended for, as well as further conferring a 
right of explanation to users. 
C. A Rights-Based Impact Assessment and a Right to Audit: 
Safeguarding the Safeguards 
In practice, explainability is not limited to revelations to the public or the 
individual user upon its request. Instead, it includes putting in place internal 
company procedures of oversight, combined with the right to react when affected 
individuals raise concerns. From an operational point of view, an open-record 
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policy and a right to explainability should correspond to an obligation to perform 
an impact assessment, which in turn would enable auditing by affected parties. 
Impact assessments are certainly not novel—they are often used to 
understand the risks generated by activities and identify ways of managing them. 
In fact, impact assessments are widely used in environmental law240 and are 
becoming more and more popular in data protection regulation.241 
The GDPR, for example, specifically requires that when processing is done 
through new technologies and is likely to result in high risks for data subjects, a 
prior Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) must be carried out.242 This 
requirement stems from the notion of privacy by design and aims at building 
privacy-aware or privacy-friendly systems, starting from the beginning of the 
process of technology design rather than tackling privacy issues at the end of it.243 
Within the same lines, the A29WP describes the DPIA as a process for building 
and demonstrating compliance by systematically examining automated processing 
techniques to determine the measures necessary to “manage the risks to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons resulting from the processing of personal data.”244 
More specifically, the GDPR proposes impact assessments primarily 
centered on data quality and data security.245 This derives from the procedural 
approach focused on data management risk assessment, which characterizes the 
development of data protection in Europe. The core principle of EU data protection 
is that of providing data subjects with control over their own information. As this 
information amounts to data of various nature, processed for various ends, the only 
viable approach is a procedural one. In this way, one can consistently secure all the 
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stages of data processing, from data collection to communication of data to third 
parties.246 
However, considering that a procedural and risk management approach 
leaves aside the actual nature of the safeguarded interests, it may not be the most 
suitable form of impact assessment in the case of algorithmic copyright 
enforcement. Copyright law entails a specific set of rights, freedoms, and values 
that should be considered beyond—or at least beside—the technology deployed to 
enforce. A copyright impact assessment needs to adopt a more rights-oriented 
approach and focus also on the individual and societal impact of the technologies. 
The nature of the technology has direct relevance in the assessment process as it 
determines the most appropriate measures to take when safeguarding the rights and 
values impacted. A rights-based impact assessment thus encompasses the potential 
negative outcomes on a variety of fundamental rights and principles while also 
taking into account the ethical and social consequences of algorithmically enforced 
copyright law. 
A rights-based impact assessment ought to be carried out during each phase 
of the algorithm development and deployment. This will achieve ex-ante and ex-
post evaluations of how third parties and society overall are affected.247 During the 
design and development stage, an ex-ante impact assessment enables the evaluation 
of how the algorithm at stake works, it ensures that it functions as intended and 
identifies problematic processes or assumptions. This analysis provides an 
opportunity to modify the algorithm design at an early stage, to build in rights 
compliance, to include monitoring mechanisms from the beginning, or to stop the 
development of an algorithm whenever rights-related concerns cannot be 
addressed. An ex-post impact assessment, conducted during the deployment stage, 
enables monitoring an algorithm’s effects during operation. This entails observing 
if the oversight and safeguards set during the design and development phase are 
indeed able to identify and respond to rights violations once the algorithm is 
deployed. This ability to react to violations is key, as any effective impact 
assessment requires that problematic processes must be capable of being 
reconsidered, revised or adjusted.248 
Balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement can be achieved by placing a 
tool in the hands of affected users that allows them to challenge the algorithmic 
decision-making and address violations of their rights. Such a tool works as a 
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complement to the right-based impact assessment and could also be at the disposal 
of researchers and authorities to test the processes deployed and exercise oversight. 
While a right to explanation enables affected individuals to comprehend whether 
the law is algorithmically enforced in a balanced manner, it does not provide a tool 
to react to a lack of balance and to challenge it.249 Therefore, beyond the right to 
explainability—which still plays an important role—an effective regulatory toolkit 
should also consider the adoption of a right to have the algorithm audited. This, 
again, was contemplated by the A29WP Guidelines concerning data processing, 
where, in the context of algorithmic decision-making, the authority envisioned 
substantial third-party oversight by suggesting the implementation of third-party 
audits.250 Indeed, Recital 71 of the GDPR could be interpreted in the sense of 
required auditing.251 Though, to avoid the misuse of an auditing request, the 
specifics of it should be devised in such a way to not constitute an excessive burden 
on companies developing and deploying algorithms. For example, it could be 
envisaged as a consumer association or as a collective right that can be acted upon 
when a substantial number of individuals claim to have been affected. For example, 
a recent proposal for a directive for the protection of the collective interests of 
consumers provides consumers with a redress mechanism by strengthening their 
access to justice.252 At the same time, these provisions strive to strike the necessary 
balance between access to justice and procedural safeguards against abusive 
litigation which could unjustifiably hinder the ability of businesses to operate in the 
Single Market.253 
In sum, from an operational point of view, online platforms algorithmically 
enforcing copyright law should follow procedures to ensure that this occurs in a 
balanced manner. Beyond designing algorithms in a way that they are balanced by 
design and implement the safeguards needed to contemplate all the interests at 
stake, companies should also adopt procedures, such as ex-ante and ex-post right-
based impact assessments and auditing, which when requested by groups of 
affected individuals would provide oversight in algorithmic copyright enforcement. 
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Starting from the proposition that the algorithmic society is here to stay, this 
article formulates a proposal for balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. The 
current development of autonomous systems and self-learning algorithms indicates 
that technology will continue to provide an increasingly sophisticated tool of 
compliance. In such a setting it becomes crucial to govern adequately the 
development that we are witnessing. 
To this end, having surveyed the European policies on tackling illegal 
content online within the DSM Strategy,254 I provided evidence of a strong trend 
towards algorithmic enforcement in the various provisions that have been adopted. 
I also discussed how this algorithmic enforcement is, in turn, morphing into 
algorithmic content regulation in European law.255 
The case of algorithmic copyright enforcement demonstrates how 
technology protects copyright law online and its evolution over the years—from 
automated instruments removing content signaled as infringing by right holders, to 
autonomous systems filtering allegedly infringing content and preventing its 
reappearance online. These activities initially took place within the safe harbor 
regime which would shield online intermediaries from liability for third parties’ 
infringing content; however, under the recent DSM Directive, a new phase has been 
ushered in. Online intermediaries have become directly liable for third parties’ 
infringing content unless they adopt systems that prevent infringement from taking 
place. In other words, they are at risk of liability unless they algorithmically enforce 
copyright law through autonomous systems capable of detecting and preventing the 
upload of infringing content. This shift from automation to autonomy has been 
paralleled with a shift from ex-post algorithmic copyright enforcement—as per the 
robo-notice and takedown–to ex-ante algorithmic copyright enforcement—as per 
the autonomous filtering systems. The aim of avoiding infringement instead of 
remedying it is what brings about a regime of algorithmic content regulation.256 
This trend towards algorithmically enforcing legal rules and content 
regulation raises wide concerns, which this work has summarized with a focus on 
algorithmic copyright enforcement. While several efforts have already been made 
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to try and overcome the shortcomings of algorithmic copyright enforcement,257 
coordinated and balanced action is still absent. 
Besides the approaches proposed in the literature, the European legal 
framework promotes several hard and soft legal instruments that can be used to 
achieve a more balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement. The various 
principles, recommendations, suggestions and tools already adopted are, however, 
scattered in numerous policies and actions introduced by the European institutions 
over the years. 
In this article, I contribute to the existing debate on algorithmic copyright 
enforcement by proposing a regulatory toolkit that could also provide insights for 
a better algorithmic society overall.258 The starting point is the principle for a more 
balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement regime which translates into the need 
for open record policies and a right to explanation. This is coupled with the 
obligation of a rights-based impact assessment and a right to audit. 
The regulatory toolkit proposed herein represents the first step towards a 
more coordinated approach to algorithmic copyright enforcement. It introduces the 
discussion on “balance by design”, i.e. the engineering of online platforms from 
their beginning in a way that takes into consideration all the rights involved. 
However, while balance by design can be a very attractive concept as it strives to 
achieve a more balanced algorithmic copyright enforcement ab initio, it needs to 
be carefully inserted within a sound legal framework259 and complemented with a 
series of further instruments.260 
Despite the need to govern algorithms through both specific measures and 
a sound legal framework, some of the broader concerns raised by algorithmic 
enforcement and regulation may prove hard to eliminate. Specifically, algorithmic 
enforcement and regulation lead to legal automation.261 Whatever semi-optimal 
system we may achieve, legal automation runs the risk of jeopardizing social 
reflexivity and collective and individual autonomy. In other terms, there is the 
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imminent danger of unintended consequences on how we conceive the law and 
interact with it. 
First, social reflexivity (i.e. the public scrutiny, discussion and evaluation 
of norms) is a crucial factor for an accurate understanding and application of the 
law.262 Legal automation, being a largely impersonal process, is less capable of 
taking into account context-specific factors. It thereby risks altering the relationship 
between law and facts and undermining the exact circumstances of the case. In 
other words, legal automation is likely to eliminate the distinction between rules 
and standards. Rules establish basic instructions for behavior and require consistent 
treatment of similar cases, eliminating the need to reconsider recurring issues. 
Standards, on the other hand, permit decision-makers to tailor an outcome to the 
facts. For example, changing circumstances brought about by technology can be 
taken into account.263 At least for the time being, automated systems are primarily 
apt to apply rules rather than standards. This is due to how an algorithm works to 
predetermine an outcome for a set of facts. This promotes a decontextualized 
assessment over context-dependent decision making. Consequently, the complexity 
of the legal system is reduced and tends to isolate and set in stone notions that are 
instead subject to evolution. 
Second, legal automation may also impair collective and individual 
autonomy by modeling social conduct by design.264 The non-compliance with a set 
of prescriptions triggers certain effects. However, when enforcement becomes 
algorithmic—and, specifically, when the algorithm works ex-ante, preventing the 
violation from taking place as in the case of algorithmic copyright enforcement—
the law is no longer just a set of rules, it becomes a set of effects that apply 
regardless of whether an infringement has occurred. 
As a result, the discussion on the modeling of a truly balanced algorithmic 
enforcement must go hand in hand with the conversation on its unintended 
consequences. This should encompass both how the law is conceived as well as 
how law and society interact with one another. 
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